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 crude way some investors look at the risk in investing in government bonds in the 
euro  area  periphery  is  to simply  calculate  a  hypothetical  ‘recovery  value’  for  the 
country by comparing the size of its foreign debt (excluding equity, which is loss 
absorbing)  to  its  total  foreign  assets.  The  difference  between  these  two  figures  gives  the 
amount the country would not be able to repay if it had to liquidate all its assets to pay off its 
foreign creditors (but not foreign equity holders). The ratio gives one the ‘recovery ratio’, i.e. 
how many cents on the euro foreign creditors could expect in this kind of situation (column 3 
in Table 1). The table below thus provides the ratio of (gross) foreign debt to total (gross) 
foreign assets where (gross) foreign debt is defined as total (gross) foreign liabilities minus 
inward FDI and minus portfolio equity in the country. 
Table 1. Basic data for recovery ratios (€ billion) 
  Total foreign 
assets 
(1) 
Foreign debt 
(2) 
Recovery ratio 
(in %) 
(3)=(1)/(2) 
Official financing 
(= non-loss absorbing 
debt) 
Greece  212  361  0.59  228.5 
Ireland  2,314  1,426  1.62  49.1 
Portugal  279  350  0.79  51.1 
Spain  1,211  1,597  0.76  - 
Italy  1,599  1,669  0.96  - 
Source: Own calculations based on data from Eurostat, IMF, ECB and the European Commission.  
 
Table 2 shows the recovery ratios in two ways: i) as a percentage of the overall recovery rate 
in which no distinction is made between private and official creditors and ii) as a percentage 
of the recovery value for private investors, which must be adjusted for that part of the debt 
that is senior and will thus be repaid before private investors are repaid.  
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i)  The  overall  recovery  values  vary  widely  among  the  GIIPS  countries  (Greece,  Italy, 
Ireland, Portugal and Spain), with a low of close to 60% for Greece. But for Ireland the 
hypothetical recovery value would even be above 100% because the net debt of the 
country is more than covered by loss-absorbing equity. Even on a liquidation basis, 
Ireland thus looks like a safe bet. Italy is not quite in the same situation as Ireland, but 
given its modest net debt, its hypothetical recovery rate would be very close to 100%. 
Portugal  has  a  slightly  higher  overall  recovery  rate  than  Spain  because  a  higher 
proportion  of  its  external  liabilities  is  in  the  form  of  loss-absorbing  equity.  This 
variability in recovery rates points to the importance of foreign direct investment and 
other  ‘non-debt  creating’  capital  inflows,  which  can  mitigate  the  vulnerability  of  a 
capital-importing country. 
ii)  Given that most official lending – i.e. funding from the IMF, the ECB and probably 
even the EFSF (certainly the ESM) – is senior, the recovery value for private investors 
must be lower. (A comparison of the prices of local law bonds to foreign law bonds 
provides some indication of the relevance of the phenomenon.1) The second column of 
Table 2 thus shows the estimated private recovery rate given the known amounts of 
official funding. For Greece the private recovery rate thus falls to 35% if one takes into 
account only EFSF and the bilateral loan facility. If one takes into account the funding 
that Greek banks have received from the ECB as well, the recovery rate the private 
sector can expect actually goes to essentially zero.  
Table 2. Recovery ratios in the GIIPS  
  Overall recovery ratio (in %)  Private sector recovery ratio (in %) 
Greece  0.59  35 (1.0) 
Ireland  1.62   
Portugal  0.79  76 
Spain  0.76  74 (69) 
Italy  0.96  95 
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat data for the international investment positions. 
Since the amounts of official lending are increasing continuously, it may make more sense to 
look at what would (will) happen if the official funding of the GIIPS continues.  
The series of figures below thus shows the evolution of the hypothetical recovery value for 
the GIIPS2 countries as a function of the amount of official financing they receive (all sources 
combined). It is apparent that the relationship is not linear: initially official, senior financing 
has only a small impact on recovery values as the total amount is small relative to the total 
debt of the country. However, once the total amount is large, even small additional amounts 
can have a large impact on recovery values. 
                                                   
1 This  note  concentrates  on  recovery  values,  not  present  values  of  long  dated  official  credits  at 
favourable  rates.  The  argument  made  recently  in  VoxEU  by  Piero  Ghezzi  –  "Official  lending: 
Dispelling  the  lower  recovery value  myth",  VoxEU.org, 21  June  2012  –  that  official  lending could 
enhance recovery values if it is at or below market rates does thus not apply when insolvency actually 
occurs because at that point the official credits become due immediately. 
2 As an interesting aside, one should note that in the case of Ireland the subordination effect does not 
work because the recovery rate would in any event be above 100%. WHY AN ESM PROGRAMME COULD BE A KISS OF DEATH | 3 
 
This  implies  that  the  argument  that  the  €100  billion  provided  to  Spain  will  not  have  a  strong 
subordination effect is misplaced. Even if this sum has only a small impact, it will still increase the 
need for further support, which in turn will lead to larger subordination effects. There is thus a danger 
that the combined impact of the EFSF programme for bank recapitalization, higher ECB lending to 
Spanish banks and the Securities Markets Programme (SMP)3 will lead to a spiral of ever-increasing 
risk premia and ever-larger injections of official financing – which then leads to higher risk premia. 
This seems to be a danger for Spain and also but to a smaller degree for Portugal. It is less likely in the 
case of Italy, whose recovery value remains rather high even for large values of official financing. 
Secondary market purchases by the EFSF (or even by the ESM) should not have this negative effect 
since they should be pari passu with private investors. Secondary market purchases should thus be 
preferred to a full EFSF/ESM programme or the SMP (after the ECB asserted absolute seniority in 
Greece) or even regular ECB lending to banks for which the ECB is also likely to assert seniority. 
Figure 1. Greece: Recovery rate for private sector (%) as a function of the rescue package (% GDP) 
 
Figure 2. Portugal: Recovery rate for private sector (%) as a function of the rescue package (% GDP) 
 
                                                   
3 Interventions by the Eurosystem in public and private debt securities markets in the euro area to 
ensure depth and liquidity in those market segments that are dysfunctional. 
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Figure 3. Spain: Recovery rate for private sector (%) as a function of the rescue package (% GDP) 
 
 
Figure 4. Italy: Recovery rate for private sector (%) as a function of the rescue package (% GDP) 
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